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THE SIGNIFICANCE OF
NATURAL LAW IN
CONTEMPORARY LEGAL
THOUGHT
CHARLES E. MARSKE, PH.D.*
CHARLES P. KOFRON, M.A.**
STEVEN VAGO, PH.D.***
INTRODUCTION
The idea of natural law is possibly as old as philosophy itself. The
thinking, philosophizing, and writing on substantive justice has been dom-
inated for milleniums in Western civilization by a single theory-that of
natural law. Pospisil correctly observes that until the time of Bentham, the
basic tenets of natural law theory were consistently accepted as self-
evident and widely incorporated into the words of juridical scholars.' The
pervasiveness of natural law theory is reflected in the tendency of certain
contemporary social scientists to refer to it as constituting the folk theory
of Western justice. In recent years, however, the theory of natural law has
fallen into disrepute in law and the social sciences. Among contemporary
sociologists, Philip Selznick's comment reflects the current state of affairs:
"The reputation of natural law is not high. The phrase conjures up a world
of absolutisms, of theological fiat, of fuzzy, unoperational 'mystical' ideas,
of thinking uninformed by history and by [a] variety of human situa-
tions."2
The typical contemporary lawyer or social scientist knows little about
moral or social philosophy, but if legal or sociological knowledge and public
policy is no more than a matter of legal or scientific technique, why should
they? In a scientific and technocratic era, moral philosophy is an idiosyn-
cracy in the real world of action, a quaint remnant of the nineteenth
century.' This situation is reflected in the lack of appreciation of the role
of values, beliefs, and assumptions in the process of "thinking" and
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"knowing." A brief review of the pedagogy of contemporary American law
schools is illustrative.
The Socratic method, the deduction of legal principles from a tireless
comparison of case after case, remains the basic teaching device in contem-
porary American law schools. As Scott Turow notes: "Going to law school
involves learning a lot of legal rules . . .[;] there is quite a premium
placed on mastering the rules and knowing how to apply them." Law is
at odds with ambiguity and uncertainty, and the institutions of-legal edu-
cation reflect a similar emphasis on sureness and definition. Beyond mere
rules and their application, however, the law is a reflection of underlying
and often competing values, beliefs, and assumptions. Nevertheless, mod-
ern legal education evidences little concern for investigating the values and
assumptions that produce the rules in the first place.
As a set of basic values and assumptions, conceptions of natural law
have reflected some of man's deepest beliefs about human nature and
society. Theories of natural law entail beliefs and assumptions about what
is real and desirable and thus have important implications about what can
be accomplished and changed in the world. Each of us learns "existential
assumptions" about how things presumably are; we also learn "normative
assumptions," beliefs about goodness or badness, about how things pre-
sumably ought to be. Normative and existential assumptions are so inter-
twined as to be inseparable, except analytically.'
Natural law, consisting of both existential and normative assump-
tions, can either be postulated, explicitly formulated and stated, or remain
unpostulated and unlabeled-existing as assumptions embedded in our
thought, but in the background of our attention. Although an in-depth
review of the history of natural law in Western thought is beyond the scope
of this work, a brief overview suggests that conceptions of natural law,
containing some of our most fundamental assumptions about man and
society, always somewhat inarticulable in nature, have become progres-
sively inarticulated in both law and the social sciences.
Are we to conclude that as explicit reference to natural law dimin-
ishes, such conceptions concomitantly decrease in their influence in the
modern world-that any investigation of theories of natural law is merely
an historical exercise of questionable relevance for the contemporary
scene? On the contrary, contemporary lawyers and social scientists do
commit themselves to background assumptions, irrespective of whether
these beliefs are generally recognized and made explicit or remain largely
unrecognized and implicit. Whether social theories and legal pronounce-
ments unavoidably require and must rest logically on some underlying
assumption is a problem for philosophers of science and logicians.' Lawyers
4 Turow, The Trouble with Law School, 80 HA.v. MAGAZINE 1, 62 (1977).
A. GOULDNER, THE COMING CRISIS OF WESTERN SOCIOLOGY 32 (1970).
Id. at 31.
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and social scientists have used and are influenced by such assumptions.
This situation is an empirical issue that can be, and has been, investi-
gated and confirmed.
CORE CONCEPTIONS OF NATURAL LAW
Before reviewing the factors which have been influential in producing
such a shift in the perceived relevance of natural law, we shall briefly
consider the basic definitions and primary functions of natural law. All
ideas of natural law share a basic common belief in the existence of certain
fundamental legal principles and institutions which are, in turn, grounded
in the general plan of life and inherent in all ordered social existence. These
principles enunciate absolute standards of justice.7
As a general system of basic assumptions and values, natural law in
the Western world has been referred to as a guide to the interpretation of
enacted law as well as an ideal where no rule of law has been declared.
Although it has functioned as an ideal model for assessing enacted law,
natural law nevertheless has exhibited a changing content. Basic premises
about legality, including the underlying assumptions and values regarding
human nature and society, have shifted. As societies change, new rules and
doctrines are needed in order to give effect to natural law principles in the
context of new demands, new circumstances, and new opportunities.8 In
viewing the shifting notions of natural law from a Western
weltanschauung, it becomes evident that, at times, positive law has been
reflective of natural law.
The notion of natural law has been used by both the conservative and
the revolutionary-reform elements of society to either rationalize and jus-
tify existing institutional practices or to initiate radical changes. Through-
out the centuries, appeals were made to natural law when the political
skies were darkened by new currents of thought pressing upon the estab-
lished order. The natural law idea, as immutable, a priori, normal, sponta-
neous and universal, ideologically deemphasized the empirical, changing,
local and reasoned aspects of social life.
In the domain of jurisprudence, legal philosophy and scholarship, nat-
ural law was employed to designate the ethical justification of law as a
whole or the a priori element antecedent to all law. Building upon the
justification of law, the natural law concept includes such aspects as the
ideal source of law, the invariant rule of law, autonomy deriving its validity
from its own inherent values, and spontaneity derived from its living and
organic properties.'
Natural law is nota generalized description of what actually goes on
in the natural realm of our experience. It is, in fact, normative in nature,
a presciption for and a description of a universe that ought to be. It is an
ideal type and, as such, presumes a certain set of ideals or values endemic
T H. KELSEN, GENERAL THEORY OF LAW AND STATE (1946).
Selznick, supra note 2, at 85.
Gurvitch, Natural Law, in 11 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF THE SOCIAL SCIENC ES 284-90 (1933).
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to an inquiry directed along these lines.
The origins of the theory of natural law are immersed in the historical
myths of early civilization and confused with the doctrines of ancient
religions. With Aristotle, the distinction between natural law and human
law was systematically formulated. After him, the notion of natural law
as a philosophical, juridical and ethical idea was accepted as one of the
most fundamental concepts of our civilization. 0 Prior to reviewing the
philosophical development of natural law, it is appropriate to consider that
aspect of natural law which focuses on the meaning of nature.
Benjamin Wright isolates eight meanings given to the concept of na-
ture in natural law:
1) the meaning of divine law;
2) the rational or the reasonable;
3) in accord with the nature or constitution of man;
4) the just or the equitable;
5) in keeping with established customs or laws, fundamental in their char-
acter;
6) the ideal as differentiated from or opposed to the actual;
7) the appropriate or useful; and
8) the original as distinguishable from the conventional."
Although a discussion of each of these meanings and their application is
not feasible here, suffice it to say that each clearly demonstrates the purpo-
sive use of the concept. Thus, it can indeed be argued that natural law has
served as both a controversial weapon and a speculative concept.' For
illustrative purposes, there is no better place to start than with the embodi-
ment of such in Stoic philosophy.
HISTORIcAL OVERVIEw OF NATURAL LAW
Philosophical Conceptions
The Stoics considered the faculty of reason the most human quality,
one that is shared by all men. The laws of reason prevail independently of
legal and political rule, which is often accepted as a matter of convenience
and expediency rather than inherent truth. Stressing what unites men
rather than what separates them, the Stoics not only attacked narrow
tribalism and chauvinsim but also pleaded for greater equality of women
and slaves." The Stoic concept of natural law found practical application
in the Roman philosophical idea of ius naturale as well as in the Roman
legal system, ius gentium.
Once the Stoics grasped the unity of mankind, differences in sex,
class, social status, and political constitutions seemed relatively insignifi-
cant. The unity of man was part of a larger world held together by the law
V. FERM, A HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHICAL SYSTEMS 106-17 (1950).
B. WRIGHT, JR., AMERicAN INTERPRETATIONS OF NATURAL LAw 333-38 (1962).
i' Id. at 334.
W. EsENsTEIN, GREAT PoLITcAL THINKERS: FROM PLATO TO THE PRESENT 136-66 (1963).
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of nature. Hence, a law's validity rested on its intrinsic rationality rather
than the fiats of kings and emperors.
In theory, there was a sharp distinction between the law of nations and
natural law. For example, slavery was considered contrary to natural law
(in spite of Aristotle, who had thought it quite natural), but a recognized
institution of the law of nations. Yet the sharp theoretical distinction be-
tween the law of nations as a set of rules of positive law, and the law of
nature as a philosophical system of what the law ought to be, was gradually
abandoned under the impact of Stoic ideas and the two were increasingly
identified. Stoicism stressed what human institutions have in common
rather than what separates them-the first being their essence and the
second what is accidental,, local and arbitrary-natural law and the law of
nations became merged into one philosophical conceptualization.
This marked a crucial development in the unfolding of natural law
philosophy, for it is at this juncture that the Stoic formula reconciled a
fundamental rift between the enactment and the ultimate source of law.
Positive law is now a product of natural law. The enactment of law is
likened to the discovery of a particular aspect, element, or elusive fragment
of knowledge about an ideal natural order. A general theme is derived from
the supposition that positive law stems from and is also shaped by natural
law. Natural law provides the foundation and, in fact, the possibility for,
positive law. Without a natural order and principles that describe it, posi-
tive law would not exist because it could never be justified. The Greco-
Roman and Christian interpretations are legacies of this style of reasoning.
For the Greeks and Romans, natural law provided background as-
sumptions for reality. Cicero spoke of natural law as unchangeable, eter-
nal, diffused among men, and written and promulgated by God." Horace
and Quintilian, representatives of the latter period of classical Rome, also
accepted the logic of the natural law argument. In fact, so completely was
it a part of the intellectual atmosphere of the time that principles of reason
were held to be imminent in the universe and natural laws were expres-
sions of these principles. 5
The Greco-Roman contribution to the development of natural law
found an interested audience among the early proponents of Christianity.
The concept of natural law was so refined that it could easily be used in a
different schema to explain aspects of the world and the universe. The task
of transplanting the concept of natural law in Christian thought is attrib-
uted to Thomas Aquinas, who viewed the concept as equivalent to the law
of God. 6 According to Aquinas, natural law is discovered by man's "divine
faculty" of reason; thus, it is God's law as man can know it.
The political climate of thirteenth and fourteenth century Europe was
favorable and supportive of Aquinas' contentions. This is evident in the
development of canon law, where natural law principles, or the general
" Wilson, The Law of Nature, in 1 THE WORKS OF JAMES WILSON 225 (J. Andrews ed. 1896).
's C. HAINES, THE AMERICAN DOCTRINE OF JUDICIAL SUPREMACY 18-24 (1914).
" W. EBENSTEIN, supra note 13, at 230-37.
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moral principles of God implanted in human nature, became the norm
for gauging the justice of civil law. 7 Later, the concept of natural law was
expanded to include the regulatory principles of human associations. Ex-
tending the Greco-Roman interpretation in such a manner as to include
the principles of emotion in group life represents a particular pattern of
development that increasingly broadened the applicable domain of the
natural law concept.
With the development of the scientific method and the increasing
influence of science, the universe was conceived of as a system of intercon-
nected laws and exigencies which included in themselves their own justifi-
cation. Human nature and pure reason, by themselves, could be the norm
of appropriate behavior. Natural law became more identified with
"reality" and lost its normative character while God, as legislator, was
gradually pushed out of the picture."8
During the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, theories of natural
law were freed from theology and became increasingly secularized. Basic
changes in social organization, customs, and human allegiances, chroni-
cled by the appearance of Protestantism, were indicative of a more funda-
mental social transformation from collectivistic integration to a more indi-
vidualistic society. Natural law was identified with man's state in nature
prior to the development of social and governmental constraints. More-
over, it provided a reason for this particular development. Conceptuali-
zations of states of nature were increasingly used to compare current social
realities with an hypothesized antecedent order. The influence of Locke
and Rousseau stimulated such comparisons and eventually the process
culminated in the French Revolution.
Locke differentiated between society in general, as created by the
social contract, and the government, to which society delegates the func-
tions of political control. Man, while in the state of nature, was ruled only
by natural law. This was an order free of social and legal constraints. The
chief and immediate cause of man leaving this hypothesized state of nature
was the increase of private property and the desire to acquire and preserve
it in safety. The reason for government and the creation of laws is to
protect the private property of individuals. Locke maintained that revolu-
tion, 'or the dissolution of government, is justifiable whenever the terms or
purposes of this social contract are violated by those in power.
The prophet and inspiration of the French Revolution, Rousseau, be-
lieved that "art and the sciences had corrupted men." In the state of
nature, man was noble, savage, simple and peaceful. 19 The individual en-
tered into a contract in order to constitute a society from which he was to
derive many benefits. In this contract, the individual surrendered some of
his rights of freedom, but, at the same time, remained sovereign since the
contract was made among equals.
'7 C. HAINES, supra note 15, at 21-22.
s A. Lovzjoy, REFLECTIONS ON HUMAN NATURE (1961).
" C. BRINTON, IDEAS IN MAN: THE STORY OF WESTERN THOUGHT 293-96 (1960).
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Conceptions of natural law, reflecting some of the most general and
basic assumptions and beliefs about man and society, are obviously influ-
enced by profound social change. As Ehrlich states: "At the present
[time] as well as at any other time, the center of gravity of legal develop-
ment lies not in legislation, nor in juristic science, nor in juridical decision,
but in society itself." 0 Law, including its underlying assumptions, is not
fixed or predetermined but is continually being influenced by the socio-
historical milieu within which it exists. The increasing emphasis on the
individual and, specifically, on individual freedom and liberty, is clearly
seen in theories of natural law which emerged in this era.
As a new generation arises, committed to somewhat differing back-
ground assumptions, previous conceptions often come to be revised or
rejected. Generally, such shifts derive not so much from new knowledge or
new findings, but rather from new ways of looking at evidence, i.e., from
changes in the way the world is viewed. This chronology of the transforma-
tion of natural law in Western philosophical thought, which has attempted
to identify those forces in Western history which have significantly influ-
enced conceptions of natural law, serves as an introduction to the role of
natural law in law and the social sciences.
Social Scientific Conceptions
Out of the secularized world of the "self-made" bourgeoisie which
surfaced after the French Revolution in nineteenth century Europe, sociol-
ogy emerged. Early sociologists focused on problems of social order under
the impetus of widespread social change produced by the Revolution. In
these efforts, the doctrine of natural law played a crucial role and had a
profound influence on the development of the social sciences. Strains of
natural law, materialism, determinism, and science, as well as ideas of
progress and evolution, all found their way into the intellectual pedigree
of the social sciences.2 1 Many anthropologists, historians, and sociologists
accepted the task of searching for scientific laws of human behavior, which
were likened to the invariant laws. These developments marked still an-
other crucial turning point in the conception of natural law. The concept
came to.figure prominently in the analytical schemes of a number of influ-
ential social scientists. In these more relativized and secularized versions,
pure human reason slowly replaced God as the origin of natural law.
Much Western social thought can be categorized as either consensus
or conflict social thought. Both consensus and conflict theories make refer-
ence to a concept of natural order, usually expressed in terms of the con-
cept of natural law.
Consensus sociology, as reflected in the work of Comte, Spencer,
Durkheim, and contemporary structural-functionalists, emphasizes the
dependence of men on structured group life. References to the "natural
E. EHRLICH, FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLES OF THE SOCIOLOGY OF LAW xv (1936).
21 N. TIMASHEFF, SOCIOLOGICAL THEORY: ITS NATURE AND GROWTH 23 (3d ed. 1967).
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order of society" abound. The persistence of existing social institutions and
social arrangements is emphasized, as social facts are given ethical sanc-
tions through interpreting them as the result of the unfolding of laws of
nature.
In the mid-nineteenth century, for example, Comte maintained that
the proper social order established itself according to the laws of nature.
Following Comte, Spencer and other early social scientists believed that
science was in a position to uncover the good, the beautiful, and the true.
Their scholarship often held and reinforced the notion that nature had
immutable laws of structure, change, and function which were necessary
and just.
According to Comte, each particular social order may contain, at
times, certain defects or deficiences, but this situation can be rectified by
the rational intervention of human beings. This conception stems from
Comte's ideas of the relative flexibility of social laws. Order is possible only
with the support of a certain community of ideas; but no complete liberty
of opinion can be tolerated nor should it be granted.
Consistent with Comte and Spencer, for Durkheim and others, an
empirical science of ethics was held to be possible and necessary. "Of all
the various branches of sociology, the science of ethics is the one which
attracts us by preference and which will command our attention first of
all. 1 2 In his search for the intrinsic laws which dominated human society,
Durkheim concluded that "every society is a moral society" where
"altruism will forever be [the] fundamental basis [of social life]. 23
Structural functionalism, with its emphasis on the existence of recur-
rent social hierarchies, is a modem example of natural law's inflience on
consensus sociology. Given the persistent ambiguity of the concept of natu-
ral law, consensus sociology has continually identified ethical imperatives
with the characteristics of physical laws of nature.
Conflict sociology, on the other hand, with its emphasis on social
change and social conflict as fundamental social processes, has persistently
invested the physical laws of nature with moral qualities. Rather than
focusing on existing social arrangements, conflict sociologists offered an
ideal model of man which was perfected through his emancipation of
constraining group influences. Contemporary liberal-individualistic Amer-
ican sociology is an example of the sociology of change orientation, as is
the collectivistic Marxist version.
Efforts at social engineering are not only justified but called for from
a conflict sociology perspective. The natural laws it hopes to discover are
to be used in reconstructing the world according to specific ideals. Thus,
rather than defining the existing order with ethical sanctions, the ideals
n Durkheim, Cours de Science Sociale: Lecon d'Ouverture, in REvuE INTERNATIONALE DE
L'ENSEIGNEMENT 45 (1888), quoted in D. LACAPRA, EmiLE DURKHEIM: SOCIOLOGIST AND
PHnIosoPHER 2-3 (1972).
" E. DURKHEIM, THE DIVISION OF LABOR IN Socizry (1964).
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are seen as laws of nature that must be obeyed.24
The theory of historical materialism, for example, begins with the
hypothesis that natural laws exist in the realm of social phenomena. In the
Marxist interpretation of history, these laws are evidenced in society's
collective activities and functional interrelationships. Although particular
societies vary, a common set of dynamic factors surround and are found
throughout all of them. The basic elements are technology and the social
organization of production in society, including property and class rela-
tions. These provide the grounds for and determine the major forms and
content of other phases of society's collective life, particularly its political
structure, ideology, and economy.
Class conflict, produced by existing property relations and modes of
production, furnishes the primary impetus for social change in society,
resulting in new social arrangements. The class basis of social change is
considered so much the crux of the situation that the theory has been
summed up in these brief words: history is a history of class struggles.2 5 In
historical epoch, there is to be found a class defending the status quo and
opposing change, along with a class whose interests and outlook make it
the persistent champion of the new social order. The seeds of destruction
are inevitably sown in the conditions of the bourgeois social order.2" Thus,
Marx and his followers not only elaborated the fundamental laws inherent
in human society, but also provided an analysis of their version of natural
laws intrinsic to human history that furnish the impetus for social change.
The emergence of diverse sociological perspectives resulted in the
heretofore largely unexamined natural-law doctrines coming under in-
creasingly critical scrutiny. The appearance of the legal realism movement
around the turn of the twentieth century supported this trend of reassess-
ment of natural law.
Although the conceptualization and terminology have changed, lega-
cies of classical natural-law doctrine abound in contemporary Western
social thought. A plethora of secularistic and humanistic natural law theo-
ries have appeared, such as Erich Fromm's attempts to specify the basic
qualities of man 7 and the legal historian H.L.A. Hart's efforts to enunciate
the basic needs of all societies.28
Paradoxically, even some contemporary anthropologists, among the
most relativistic of all social scientists, subscribe to a natural law-like
model of human nature. In 1966 they voted for a resolution directed at
United States military involvement in Vietnam which stated: "These
methods of warfare offend human nature." 9 Do we assume that these
24 L. BRAMSON, THE POLITICAL CONTEXT OF SOCIOLOGY 22 (1961).
2 K. MARX & F. ENGELS, MANIFESTO OF THE COMMUNIST PARTY, in BASIC WRITINGS ON PoLrrIcs
AND PHILOSOPHY, KARL MARX AND FRIEDRICH ENGELS 6 (L. Feuer ed. 1959).
25 Id. at 26-27.
E. FROMM, THE SANE SocIETY (1955).
28 H. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW (1961).
21 American Anthropological Association Res. (1966).
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purveyors of cultural relativism have momentarily forgotten their most
notable doctrine? No; even here faint traces of natural law are detectable
in an unusual paradox reflected in the doctrine of cultural relativism. The
basic impulse which motivates these teachings presumes the existence of
a morally relevant common humanity. The fundamental objective of this
doctrine is to encourage respect for others as human.
It is apparent that, throughout the history of Western social thought,
the legacy of classical natural-law doctrine has remained influential.
Legalistic Conceptions of Natural Law
In the realm of legal science, the concept of natural law has proved to
be as durable as law and science itself. The concept has been utilized in
legal philosophy as well as by several schools of jurisprudence. This section
will examine the cases made on behalf of natural law and its current
implications for the study of law.
Historically, the concept of natural law has posed questions about
some particular aspect of law or legal reality. The concept is of direct
juridical interest since it is law or the legal system which is the referent of
natural-law inquiry or debate. The concept of natural law implies subjec-
tivity. Positivism in the legal sciences would thus exclude natural law from
the proper domain of scientific legal inquiry. However, this is excluding an
all too important dimension of law. It has been realized that with every
legal scholar, lawyer, judge, legislator-in short, everyone that has any-
thing to do with enactment or operation of law-there is some notion of
what the law ought to be, how it should be interpreted, and what consti-
tutes justice in the most abstract and general sense of the term. Positive
law exists on this foundation. Withdrawing the concept of natural law from
the science of law on this basis does not make this phenomenon any less
real. In the insightful words of Vecchio: "What is a source of difficulty
for science does not cease to exist in reality; and it is a vain illusion to
ignore a need because we cannot satisfy it."" In view of this, several of the
significant legalistic conceptions of natural law will be noted.
The Stoic and Thomistic influence on conceptualizing law propelled
the natural law argument into the limelight of legal and political debate.3 1
This particular doctrine emphasized the obligatory nature of law or the
duty imposing quality of law that was held to be objectified natural law.
After the sixteenth century, this natural law concept became mistakenly
identified with enacted law. This development resulted in a general decline
in the frequency of references to natural law after the eighteenth century
as a consequence of the inroads made by positivism on legal scholarship,
jurisprudence and philosophy.
Under the yoke of positivism, natural-law references became unfash-
ionable. Legal positivism, in both legal education and scholarship, af-
G. VECCHIo, THE FORMAL BASES OF LAW 17 (1914).
3, B. BROWN, THE NATURAL LAW READER 1-3 (1960).
24 CATHOLIC LAWYER, WINTER 1978
firmed the proposition that there are no rational grounds for building upon
a natural-law argument. Positivism, in the legal sciences, asserts that a
pure science of law is built from a case by case appraisal of enacted laws
and the institutional processes that signal their emergence in the social
and political order. These same sentiments are reflected in the words of
Dabin, who suggests that a science of natural law stands as a contradiction
in terms: "It is contradictory to speak of natural[-law] jurisprudence,
because 'jurisprudence' down to its more general rules and their aims-not
only the useful but also the good and the just-is a matter of prudence,
and prudence is a matter of rational appraisal according to the cases and
not a matter of inclination .... "1 Thus, the rigors of positivism as a
methodology for scientific legal inquiry would necessarily limit the scope
of legal study to concrete cases.
This rationale has influenced legal education in a most dramatic fash-
ion. Legal education supports the building of a science of law through a
pedagogical case law system approach. This system emphasizes what the
law is at the expense of what the law ought to be.
Palmer suggests that this approach suffers from "the lack of synthesis
and overspecialization that affected the inductive science to which it was
akin. It tended to be merely descriptive. It neglected the deeper problems
of the law."' We shall return to this aspect of legal education in the
concluding remarks of this Article.
During the latter half of the nineteenth and the early twentieth centu-
ries, a new strain of legal theory emerged which stood in reaction to the
positivistic claims that law constituted a self-contained reality. The com-
parative and historical school of jurisprudence, along with the sociological
school of jurisprudence, emphasized an approach to the study of law in
action. According to this view, an adequate understanding of law could not
be strictly derived from an hermetically sealed approach-a view that
posited law in a closed, self-contained structure of logic. The leading pro-
ponents of the latter school, Roscoe Pound in the United States and
Rudolph von Jhering in Europe, agreed on the principle that law must be
viewed in relation to some standard. This standard was the satisfaction
of social wants with law the primary mechanism for achieving them.
From this perspective, law was evaluated according to an ideal, with
natural law as the common referent for such comparisons. In Pound's
words: "As both a creative ideal and as an ideal basis of criticism, under
whatever name it is called and however we arrive at it, a picture of the
purpose of the legal order must have a place of real importance in any
system of science of law.""4 In 1914, the Italian jurist Vecchio argued
that natural law in the legal sciences was refuted primarily on the grounds
32 Dabin, Is There a Juridical Natural Law?, in THE NATURE OF LAW, READINGS IN LEGAL
PHILOsoPHy 25, 32 (M. Golding ed. 1966).
3 Palmer, Defense Against Leviathan, 32 A.B.A.J. 328, 332(1946).
Pound, Introduction to G. DEL VECcmo, GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF LAW ix (1956).
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that it was not positive law.Y The simple affirmation that law is only
positive which, as Vecchio adds, cannot be proved or disproved, has been
the typical manner of demolishing natural law arguments. This trend has
been supported by the dominant religious dogma associated with the use
of the term. Natural-law conclusions are pertinent to the science and phi-
losophy of law, however, since these justifications have guided or have been
used to legitimate positive law. Natural law does not represent the totality
of law. Rather, it is but one system of law.3"
The legal realism movement in jurisprudence may be thought. of as a
branch of the sociological school of jurisprudence. The writings of its major
proponents echo the sentiments of Oliver Wendell Holmes, who is credited
as the founder of the movement. Holmes' remarks in his treatise on com-
mon law are an apt description of the parameters of legal realism: "The
life of the law has not been logic; it has been experience. The felt necessi-
ties of the times, the prevalent moral and political theories, intentions of
public policy, avowed or unconscious, even the prejudices which judges
share with their fellow men, have had a good deal more to do than the
syllogisms in determining the rules by which men should be governed." 37
Similar to sociological jurisprudence, legal realism is oriented to law
in action. Unlike sociological jurisprudence, legal realism specifically fo-
cuses on the dilemmas of decisionmaking in law. Jerome Frank's belief in
the capriciousness of fact-determining in trial courts led him to the con-
clusion, that legal precision and a science of it is impossible. 3 Thurman
Arnold viewed law and, specifically, rules governing the behavior of indi-
viduals as ceremonial and ritualistic symbols. 9 Both conclude that there
is some discrepancy between what law is held to be and what it actually
is. Whereas sociological jurisprudence views the ends of law as subject to
a natural-law accountability, the legal realists view the means of law as
problematic. For the legal realists, theories of natural law are applicable
to the moral dimensions of decisionmaking in the enactment of law and
in the design and implementation of a legal system.
Natural-law terminology currently serves as a heuristic device to ana-
lyze any discrepancies involved in both the creation and application of
law. The arguments advanced by Lon Fuller and Harry W. Jones are
indicative of recent attempts to describe the role of natural law in the
framework of contemporary legal systems. 0
Lon Fuller views the basic tenet of natural law as reason, which goes
into the making and operation of a legal system. Legal systems, however,
can never be totally equipped to handle minute departures from specific
laws. Legislative foresight can influence such situations, but never entirely
u G. DEL VEccmo, supra note 30, at 14-20.
3 Id. at 20.
37 0. HOLMEs, THE COMMON LAW 5 (1963).
" J. FRANK, LAW AND THE MODERN MIND (1930).
n T. ARNOLD, THE SYMBOLS OF GOVERNMENT (1935).
, L. FuLLER, ANATOMY OF THE LAW 115-19 (1968).
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eliminate the matter of discretion in the decisionmaking process. As Fuller
succinctly observes:
Reason can shape the fundamental structure of a legal system; it cannot
prepare the law to deal with every twist and turn that human affairs can take.
Under any legal system embarrassing and borderline cases will arise that can,
with equal rationality or irrationality, be decided either way. To reach some
disposition of these cases we must employ a principle of authoritative deci-
sion and pass them over to a judge or administrator to decide, not because
he will know how to decide them, but simply because somebody must.4 '
The decisionmaking process is a product of discretion which, in turn, in-
volves underlying values and assumptions.
For Jones, "every principle of the positive law," which includes "every
statute, every constitutional provision, and every case-law rule, '4 2 creates
zones of both certainty and uncertainty. Zones of certainty refer to the
provisions that explicitly state the grounds for entertaining and deciding
a particular case. No law or legal generalization completely attains this
precision. The task of law, as Jones states, "involves a process far less
orderly and far more difficult than the mechanical application of legal
generalization to fact-situations." 3 Thus, zones of uncertainty and indi-
vidual discretion are part and parcel to law and the task of applying legal
generalizations. The effort is continually made to limit the range of arbi-
trary decisionmaking by closing the distance between fact determination
and rule application. The pervasiveness of this concern is evidenced in
jurisprudence and underlies the very effort of singling out the legal is from
the legal ought to be.
However, such a separation in practice is untenable. The basis for this
argument is comparable to Fuller's concern with the fact that law can
never completely come to grips with the uniqueness of individual cases. In
this vein, Jones points to the need for analyzing the moral dimension of
law, which is framed by zones of uncertainty, created by positive law, and
found "in the process of responsible decision which pervades the whole of
law in life."44 The highwater mark of natural-law thinking in the United
States is the "emergence and survival of the doctrine of judicial supremacy
which subjects positive law to the inhibition of the moral order, constitu-
tionally implemented." '4"
In the legal practice, natural-law conceptions abound in codes of pro-
fessional responsibility. Mayer makes the point that "the law lives not in
courts but in law offices; and in law offices the law comes out of books.""
In keeping with the most rudimentary notions of the adversary system, the
" Id. at 116-17.
4' Jones, Legal Realism and Natural Law, in THE NATURE OF LAW, READINGS IN LEGAL
PHILOSOPHY 261, 269 (M. Golding ed. 1966).
,1 Id. at 268.
" Id. at 261.
41 B. BROWN, supra note 31, at x.
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role of the lawyer is one of advocating the interests of a client and the
legality of these interests in a court of law. In so doing, the lawyer makes
an implicit determination of the legality of these interests. It is at this
juncture in the legal enterprise that underlying values and assumptions are
clearly influential. To this extent, natural law-like conceptions, in the form
of background assumptions, continue to exert a real and significant in-
fluence in the realm of law.
Contemporary Legacies of Natural Law
Selznick's contention regarding the contemporary neglect of natural
law is probably reflective of mainstream thought in both law and the social
sciences. This situation is, in turn, reflective of a larger transformation in
Western world thought in light of the burgeoning influence of society and
rationality. Law and the social sciences have become increasingly rational,
specialized and bureaucratic.
One of the principal characteristics of science and rationality is the
stance of value-neutrality. These approaches are designed to keep what
counts as truly knowable separated from what is simply felt or desired.
Distinctions such as rational-emotive, objective-subjective, and is-ought
reflect such efforts. The implication of such distinctions is that values have
no legitimate place in institutions, such as law or the social sciences, con-
cerned primarily with knowledge that is acquired through science and/or
rationality.
This distinction is seen in the dichotomy between knowledge, facts or
evidence, and values assumed by many contemporary lawyers and social
scientists. Although philosophers and logicians have continued to argue
that such a separation is untenable and all knowledge is ultimately deter-
mined by referring to values, this dichotomy nevertheless grows stronger.
In !this setting, theories of natural law have come to be defined as mere
speculation, of limited interest or utility in the analytical world. We have
reached a point where the only explicitly recognized function of natural law
is, as Wright suggests, to attempt to answer the problems of law and
politics "which seemingly cannot be answered in any way capable of objec-
tive proof. In other words, natural law, in its essence, is the attempt to
solve the unsolveable."47 In an age where law, the social sciences and
many other domains have defined their functions as piling fact upon fact,
we find a waning of explicit interest and reference to values, beliefs, and
assumptions. In turn, domain assumptions, such as current conceptions
of natural law, have indeed become increasingly implicit and have receded
into the background of our thoughts.
When large numbers of contemporary lawyers and social scientists
believe with little hesitation that empirical evidence or facts alone yield
true and adequate knowledge, they are making significant assumptions
about the nature of knowledge, man, and society. The roots of current
11 B. WRIoHT, JR., supra note 11, at 345.
24 CATHOLIC LAWYER, WINTER 1978
positive law and legal policies, for instance, are rarely, if ever, totally
derived from legal research and the resulting facts or evidence. The issue
is not how we can or cannot keep values and underlying assumptions, such
as notions of natural law, from influencing our work, but how we can
systematically take them, and their influence, into consideration.
As stated, irrespective of how implicit values and underlying assump-
tions have become, lawyers and social scientists continue to be influenced
by natural law-like conceptions in their thoughts and actions. These back-
ground assumptions become influential as they become part of our per-
sonal realities and often personal commitments. As these assumptions are
internalized in our consciousnesses, they come to function as general orien-
tations or overarching frameworks to which the larger world is assimilated
and by which it is shaped."
Historically, various theories of natural law have been cited to legiti-
mate a wide variety of thoughts and actions-ranging from doctrines sup-
portive of the state to those supportive of individual rights and the sanctity
of the individual, to functioning as the ideological and ethical basis for
socialist as well as democratic revolutions. Often normative in nature,
background assumptions usually define the world as it ought to be. As
such, following Wright, we find background assumptions becoming espe-
cially significant and influential in those instances where objective, or
generally agreed upon, facts or evidence is limited.
Efforts at explicitly specifying the nature, causes, and consequences
of these underlying values and assumptions are confounded since these
subjective influences are usually internalized in us long before "the intel-
lectual age of consent."
To a significant extent, background assumptions, conceptions of what
is "real and desirable," come to us from others. They are based upon what
we have heard, seen, or read, in both our personal and professional activi-
ties. Conceptions of similar natural law-like assumptions and values are
personally real and meaningful to lawyers, social scientists, and others; not
because they are unique but because they are collectively true. To varying
degrees, we all live within communities of assumptions which are shaped
by, and shared with, the larger society and culture. This general pervasive-
ness of fundamental background assumptions contributes to their largely
unexamined, "taken for granted character."
Our task is to recognize differing and often competing interests and
assumptions as a matter of fact, without trying to ignore them, wish them
away, or consider them unreal or devious. In considering the background
assumptions upon which the everyday world operates, it is apparent that
neither law, the social sciences nor any discipline can objectively or scien-
tifically determine which set of attributes ought to be regarded as the
essential nature of man and, accordingly, which characteristics can be
made the basis of natural law. It is nevertheless possible to analyze the
"1 A. GOULDNER, supra note 5, at 32.
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causes and consequences of such efforts.
Any meaningful investigation of the influence of background assump-
tions on human thought must be predicated on a recognition of the socio-
historical nature of all human thinking. Unfortunately, intellectuals have
done much throughout history to obscure the relationship between thought
and human existence. Although it may seem obvious to some to interpret
mental activity as reflecting the thinkers' socio-historical milieu, there has
been a pronounced preference in Western thought to claim or to assume
some "higher reality" as the source of, legitimated by, or correlated with,
human thought. In succession, these assumed "higher realities" have been
conceptualized as guardian deities, immutable essences, the heavenly
kingdom, natural law, supreme reason, national destiny, scientific prog-
ress, and corporate benevolence." Through this process human thought is
severed from its socio-historical context; subsequently, the resulting con-
ceptualizations, such as notions of natural law, assume the appearance of
entities capable of independent existence. Abstractions do not think or
act; they exist only as a result of human thought.
For example, if the sole determinant of natural law was a reality
beyond society and history, one could adduce no ground for the great
diversity of these conceptions. Why should these conceptualizations differ
from time to time and place to place? These differences result from differ-
ences in the socio-historical situations. Fundamental drives do not change.
If they are expressed differently under different conditions, we are indi-
rectly admitting that thought is determined by socio-historical factors.
By shifting attention to the socio-historical origins of human thought,
as illustrated in our review of conceptions of natural law, as well as to the
assumed dichotomy between facts and values, we can highlight the failure
to consider the influence of subjective factors, such as values, beliefs and
background assumptions on contemporary thought. As lawyers, social sci-
entists, and others have come to either largely ignore values and back-
ground assumptions or insist they are not to be attended to in the same
manner that facts and evidence are, these assumptions have slowly sunk
into subsidiary awareness. Nevertheless, background assumptions do exist
and are influential in the contemporary setting.
Recent efforts at strengthening legal ethics and ensuring human rights
are clearly guided by natural-law doctrine. The recent United Nations
declaration of human rights as well as President Carter's recent pronounce-
ments regarding the protection of inalienable human rights and American
foreign policy illustrate this influence. No matter how scientific, rational
or value neutral we have attempted to become, no discipline, including law
and the social sciences, has been able to obliterate completely the role of
values and assumptions in the decisionmaking process. The reaction of a
law student to contemporary legal education substantiates this conclusion:
11 G. REMMLING, TowARDs THE SOCIOLOGY OF KNOWLEDGE: ORIGIN AND DEVELOPMENT OF A SO-
CIOLOGICAL THOUGHT STYLE 3 (1973).
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"I don't care if Bertram Mann [professor of criminal law] doesn't want
to know how I feel about prostitution, . . . I feel a lot of things about
prostitution and they have everything to do with the way I think about
prostitution. I don't want to become the kind of person who tries to pretend
that my feelings have nothing to do with my opinions." 5
The adequacy of contemporary legal and social-scientific education
has often been judged according to its ability to foster the conceptuali-
zation of facts and values as independent entities and to maintain values
and beliefs in the role of implicit, background assumptions. Possibly, the
adequacy of legal and social scientific training ought to be viewed in light
of the ability of contemporary lawyers and social scientists to more fully
appreciate the place of values and assumptions in the decisionmaking
process of their respective disciplines.
Turow, supra note 4, at 63.
